Recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in a pre-event vaccination program: supplemental recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) by United States Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices.
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
Recommendations and Reports April 4, 2003 / Vol. 52 / No. RR-7
department of health and human services
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Recommendations for Using Smallpox Vaccine
in a Pre-Event Vaccination Program
Supplemental Recommendations of the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the Healthcare Infection




Smallpox Transmission and Control ..................................... 3
Critical Considerations ........................................................ 3
Smallpox Vaccines and VIG Availability ................................ 5
Surveillance ......................................................................... 5
Preoutbreak Vaccination of Selected Groups To
Enhance Smallpox Response Readiness ............................ 6
Smallpox Response Teams ................................................ 6
Smallpox Health-Care Teams ........................................... 6
Vaccination Method ............................................................. 7
Vaccinating Persons Administering Smallpox Vaccine
in the Pre-Event Vaccination Program ............................... 7
Preventing Contact Transmission of Vaccinia Virus ................ 7
Administrative Leave for Vaccinated Health-Care Workers .. 9
Vaccination and Blood Donation .......................................... 9
Contraindications for Use of Smallpox Vaccine
in the Pre-Event Vaccination Program ............................... 9
Precautions for Smallpox Vaccination .............................. 10
Screening for Atopic Dermatitis as a Contraindication
for Vaccination ............................................................ 10
Screening for Pregnancy as a Contraindication
for Vaccination ............................................................ 10
Screening for HIV Infection as a Contraindication
for Vaccination ............................................................ 11
Simultaneous Administration of Smallpox Vaccine
with Other Vaccines ....................................................... 12
Timing of Tuberculosis Screening and Smallpox Vaccination . 13
Reporting and Managing Adverse Events ........................... 13




Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in a pre-
event vaccination program: supplemental recommenda-
tions of the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) and the Healthcare Infection Control
Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC). MMWR
2003;52(No. RR-7):[inclusive page numbers].
The MMWR series of publications is published by the
Epidemiology Program Office, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Atlanta, GA 30333.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Julie L. Gerberding, M.D., M.P.H.
Director
David W. Fleming, M.D.
Deputy Director for Public Health Science
Dixie E. Snider, Jr., M.D., M.P.H.
Associate Director for Science
Epidemiology Program Office
Stephen B. Thacker, M.D., M.Sc.
Director
Office of Scientific and Health Communications
John W. Ward, M.D.
Director
Editor, MMWR Series
Suzanne M. Hewitt, M.P.A.
Managing Editor, MMWR Series











Vol. 52 / RR-7 Recommendations and Reports 1
The material in this report originated in the National Immunization
Program, Walter A. Orenstein, M.D., Director, and the Epidemiology
and Surveillance Division, Melinda Wharton, M.D., Director; and the
National Center for Infectious Diseases, James M. Hughes, M.D.,
Director, and the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program,
Charles Schable, M.D., Acting Director.
Recommendations for Using Smallpox Vaccine
in a Pre-Event Vaccination Program
Supplemental Recommendations of the Advisory Committee
on Immunization Practices (ACIP) and the Healthcare Infection Control
Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC)
Prepared by
Melinda Wharton, M.D.,1 Raymond A. Strikas, M.D.,2 Rafael Harpaz, M.D.,1 Lisa D. Rotz, M.D.,3
Benjamin Schwartz, M.D.,1 Christine G. Casey, M.D.,1 Michele L. Pearson, M.D.,4 and Larry J. Anderson, M.D.5
1Epidemiology and Surveillance Division, 2Office of the Director, National Immunization Program; 3Bioterrorism Prevention and Response Program,
4Division of Healthcare Quality Promotion, 5Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases
National Center for Infectious Diseases
Summary
This report supplements the 2001 statement by the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) (CDC. Vaccinia
[smallpox] vaccine: recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices [ACIP], 2001. MMWR
2001;50[No. RR-10]:1–25). This supplemental report provides recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in the pre-event
vaccination program in the United States.
To facilitate preparedness and response, smallpox vaccination is recommended for persons designated by public health authori-
ties to conduct investigation and follow-up of initial smallpox cases that might necessitate direct patient contact. ACIP recom-
mends that each state and territory establish and maintain >1 smallpox response team. ACIP and the Healthcare Infection
Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) recommend that each acute-care hospital identify health-care workers who can
be vaccinated and trained to provide direct medical care for the first smallpox patients requiring hospital admission and to
evaluate and manage patients who are suspected as having smallpox. When feasible, the first-stage vaccination program should
include previously vaccinated health-care personnel to decrease the potential for adverse events. Additionally, persons administering
smallpox vaccine in this pre-event vaccination program should be vaccinated.
Smallpox vaccine is administered by using the multiple-puncture technique with a bifurcated needle, packaged with the
vaccine and diluent. According to the product labeling, 2–3 punctures are recommended for primary vaccination and 15 punc-
tures for revaccination. A trace of blood should appear at the vaccination site after 15–20 seconds; if no trace of blood is visible,
an additional 3 insertions should be made by using the same bifurcated needle without reinserting the needle into the vaccine
vial. If no evidence of vaccine take is apparent after 7 days, the person can be vaccinated again.
Optimal infection-control practices and appropriate site care should prevent transmission of vaccinia virus from vaccinated
health-care workers to patients. Health-care personnel providing direct patient care should keep their vaccination sites covered
with gauze in combination with a semipermeable membrane dressing to absorb exudates and to provide a barrier for containment
of vaccinia virus to minimize the risk of transmission; the dressing should also be covered by a layer of clothing. Dressings used to
cover the site should be changed frequently to prevent accumulation of exudates and consequent maceration. The most critical
measure in preventing contact transmission is consistent hand hygiene. Hospitals should designate staff to assess dressings for all
vaccinated health-care workers. When feasible, staff responsible for dressing changes for smallpox health-care teams should be
vaccinated; all persons handling dressings should observe contact precautions. Administrative leave is not required routinely for
newly vaccinated health-care personnel, unless they are physically unable to work as a result of systemic signs and symptoms of
illness; have extensive skin lesions that cannot be adequately covered; or if they are unable to adhere to the recommended infection-
control precautions. Persons outside the patient-care setting can keep their vaccination sites covered with a porous dressing; hand
hygiene remains key to preventing inadvertent inoculation.
FDA has recommended that recipients of smallpox vaccine be
deferred from donating blood for 21 days or until the scab has
separated. Contacts of vaccinees, who have inadvertently con-
tracted vaccinia, also should be deferred from donating blood for
14 days after complete resolution of their complication.
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In the pre-event vaccination program, smallpox vaccina-
tion is contraindicated for persons with a history or presence of
eczema or atopic dermatitis; who have other acute, chronic,
or exfoliative skin conditions; who have conditions associated
with immunosuppression; are aged <1 year; who have a seri-
ous allergy to any component of the vaccine; or who are preg-
nant or breastfeeding. ACIP does not recommend smallpox
vaccination for children and adolescents aged <18 years dur-
ing the pre-event vaccination program. Pre-event vaccination
also is contraindicated among persons with household con-
tacts who have a history or presence of eczema or atopic der-
matitis; who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin
conditions; who have conditions associated with immunosup-
pression; or who are pregnant. For purposes of screening for
contraindications for pre-event vaccination, household con-
tacts include persons with prolonged intimate contact (e.g.,
sexual contacts) with the potential vaccinee and others who
might have direct contact with the vaccination site. Persons
with inflammatory eye disease might be at increased risk for
inadvertent inoculation as a result of touching or rubbing the
eye. Therefore, deferring vaccination is prudent for persons
with inflammatory eye diseases requiring steroid treatment
until the condition resolves and the course of therapy is complete.
Eczema vaccinatum, a serious form of disseminated vac-
cinia infection, can occur among persons with atopic derma-
titis and other dermatologic conditions. Potential vaccinees
should be queried regarding the diagnosis of atopic dermatitis
or eczema in themselves or any member of their household, or
regarding the presence of chronic or recurrent rashes consistent
with these diagnoses. Persons reporting such a rash in them-
selves or household members should not be vaccinated, unless
a health-care provider determines that the rash is not eczema
or atopic dermatitis.
Before vaccination, women of childbearing age should be
asked if they are pregnant or intend to become pregnant dur-
ing the next 4 weeks; women who respond positively should
not be vaccinated. Any woman who thinks she might be preg-
nant or who wants additional assurance that she is not preg-
nant should perform a urine pregnancy test on the day
scheduled for vaccination. If a pregnant woman is inadvert-
ently vaccinated or if she becomes pregnant within 4 weeks
after smallpox vaccination, she should be counseled regarding
concerns for the fetus. Vaccination during pregnancy should
not ordinarily be a reason to terminate pregnancy. CDC has
established a pregnancy registry to prospectively follow the out-
come of such pregnancies and facilitate the investigation of any
adverse pregnancy outcome among pregnant women who were
inadvertently vaccinated. For enrollment in the registry, con-
tact CDC at 404-639-8253.
Smallpox vaccine should not be administered to persons with
human immunodeficiency virus infection (HIV) or acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) as part of a pre-event
program because of their increased risk for progressive vac-
cinia. HIV testing is recommended for persons who have any
history of a risk factor for HIV infection or for anyone who is
concerned that he or she might have HIV infection. HIV test-
ing should be available in a confidential or anonymous set-
ting, in accordance with local laws and regulations, with results
communicated to the potential vaccinee before the planned
date of vaccination.
Smallpox vaccine can be administered simultaneously with
any inactivated vaccine. With the exception of varicella vac-
cine, smallpox vaccine can be administered simultaneously
with other live-virus vaccines. To avoid confusion in ascer-
taining which vaccine might have caused postvaccination skin
lesions or other adverse events, varicella vaccine and smallpox
vaccine should be administered >4 weeks apart. Health-care
workers scheduled to receive an annual purified protein
derivative (PPD) skin test for tuberculosis screening should
not receive the skin test until >1 month after smallpox
vaccination.
Persons with progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, and
severe generalized vaccinia or inadvertent inoculation might
benefit from therapy with VIG or cidofovir, although the lat-
ter has not been approved by FDA for this indication. Sus-
pected cases of these illnesses or other severe adverse events after
smallpox vaccination should be reported immediately to state
health departments. VIG and cidofovir are available from
CDC under Investigational New Drug protocols. Clinically
severe adverse events after smallpox vaccination should be
reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System.
Reports can be made online at https://secure.vaers.org/
VaersDataEntryintro.htm, or by postage-paid form, which is
available by calling 800-822-7967 (toll-free).
ACIP will review these recommendations periodically as new
information becomes available related to smallpox disease,
smallpox vaccines, the risk of smallpox attack, smallpox
vaccine adverse events, and the experience gained as recent
recommendations are implemented. Revised recommendations
will be developed as needed.
Introduction
In June 2001, the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) made recommendations for using smallpox
(vaccinia) vaccine to protect persons working with
orthopoxviruses and to prepare for and respond to a possible
terrorist attack involving smallpox (1). Because of the terror-
ist attacks in 2001, CDC asked ACIP to review its previous
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recommendations for smallpox vaccination. These supplemen-
tal recommendations update the 2001 recommendations for
vaccination of persons designated to respond to or care for a
suspected or confirmed case of smallpox. In addition, they
clarify and expand the primary strategy for control and con-
tainment of smallpox in the event of an outbreak (see Box for
clinical summary). Recommendations remain unchanged for
vaccination of laboratory workers who directly handle recom-
binant vaccinia viruses derived from nonhighly attenuated vac-
cinia strains or other orthopoxviruses that infect humans (e.g.,
monkeypox, cowpox, vaccinia, and variola) (1). The follow-
ing recommendations were developed after formation of a joint
working group of ACIP and the National Vaccine Advisory
Committee (NVAC) in April 2002. That working group was
joined in September 2002 by the Healthcare Infection Con-
trol Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC). A series of
public meetings and forums also were held to review available
data related to smallpox, smallpox vaccine, smallpox-control
strategies, and other concerns related to smallpox vaccination.
Smallpox Transmission and Control
Smallpox is transmitted from an infected person to another
person. Patients are most infectious during the first 7–10 days
after rash onset; transmission can occur during the prodromal
period, immediately before rash onset, when lesions in the
mouth ulcerate, releasing virus into oral secretions. Infection
is transmitted by large-droplet nuclei and occasionally by di-
rect contact or contact with fomites (e.g., clothes or bedding).
Airborne transmission has occurred rarely (2). Epidemiologic
studies have demonstrated that smallpox has a lower rate of
transmission than certain other diseases (e.g., measles, pertus-
sis, and influenza) (2,3). The greatest risk for infection occurs
among household members and close contacts of persons with
smallpox, especially those with prolonged face-to-face expo-
sure. Isolation of infected patients and vaccination and close
monitoring of contacts of patients at greatest risk for infec-
tion have been demonstrated to interrupt transmission of
smallpox (4,5). During the smallpox era, inadequate
infection-control practices sometimes resulted in transmission
in hospitals (6,7); a review of importations into Europe dur-
ing 1950–1971 determined that >50% of the spread cases were
associated with hospitals, with approximately 20% of all spread
cases related to infections among health-care workers (6). In a
review of European smallpox outbreaks, the communicability
of smallpox decreased by approximately one half when
hospital-based transmission was excluded (8).
The primary strategy to control a smallpox outbreak and
interrupt disease transmission is surveillance and containment,
which includes isolation of smallpox cases and vaccination of
persons at risk for contracting smallpox. This strategy involves
identification of infected persons through intensive surveil-
lance, isolation of smallpox patients to prevent further trans-
mission, vaccination of household contacts and other close
contacts of infected persons (i.e., primary contacts), and vac-
cination of close contacts of the primary contact (i.e., a sec-
ondary contact who would be exposed if disease developed in
the primary contact). This strategy was instrumental in the
eradication of smallpox as a naturally occurring disease,
including in areas that had low vaccination coverage (4).
During the smallpox eradication era, depending on the size
of the smallpox outbreak and the resources that were available
for rapid and thorough contact tracing, surveillance and con-
tainment activities in areas with identified smallpox cases were
sometimes supplemented with vaccination of other persons
in the area where the outbreak occurred. This was done to
expand the ring of immune persons within an outbreak area
and to further reduce the chance of secondary transmission
from smallpox patients before they could be identified and
isolated. Regardless of the geographic distribution, number of
cases, or number of concurrent outbreaks, surveillance and
containment activities remained the primary disease-control
strategy (4).
Critical Considerations
Multiple factors and assumptions were used in developing
these supplemental recommendations, as follows:
• Level of Disease Risk and Threat. Information provided
to ACIP indicated that a risk for smallpox occurring as a
result of a deliberate release by terrorists exists; however,
this risk is low, and the population at risk for such an
exposure cannot be determined. ACIP also assumed that,
regardless of the mode, magnitude, or duration of a ter-
rorism release, the epidemiology of subsequent person-
to-person transmission would be consistent with prior
experience. These recommendations also are based on the
assumption that, in addition to vaccination, health-care
workers and others would be afforded a certain level of
protection from infection through appropriate infection-
control measures, including use of appropriate personal
protective equipment.
• Expected Severe Adverse Reactions to Vaccination.
ACIP assumes that appropriate screening for
contraindications to vaccination will be implemented and
will include both vaccinated persons as well as their house-
hold contacts. ACIP further assumes that recommended
precautions will be taken to minimize both the risk for
4 MMWR April 4, 2003
BOX. Clinical summary of recommendations for using smallpox vaccine in a pre-event vaccination program
To facilitate preparedness and response, smallpox vaccination is
recommended for persons designated by public health authorities to
conduct investigation and follow-up of initial smallpox cases that
might necessitate direct patient contact. ACIP recommends that each
state and territory establish and maintain >1 smallpox response team.
Background
• During the smallpox era, the greatest risk for smallpox occurred
among household members and close contacts of persons with
smallpox, especially those with prolonged face-to-face exposure.
Therefore, the primary strategy for controlling a smallpox out-
break and interrupting disease transmission is surveillance and
containment, which includes isolation of smallpox patients and
vaccination of persons at risk for contracting smallpox. In the
event of a terrorist attack using smallpox, this strategy might be
supplemented by expanded vaccination; state and local health
departments should be able to vaccinate entire populations in a
timely manner.
Vaccine Administration and Site Care
• Dryvax® smallpox vaccine has been approved by the Food and
Drug Administration; 2.7 million doses of licensed vaccine are
available. Licensed Dryvax for civilian use is only available
through CDC. Vaccinia immune globulin (VIG), which is the
first-line therapy for certain adverse reactions to smallpox vac-
cine, is available from CDC under Investigational New Drug
protocols.
• To facilitate preparedness and response, smallpox vaccination is
recommended for members of public health response teams who
would investigate suspected cases and hospital-based health-care
teams who would provide patient care for smallpox patients.
• Smallpox vaccine is administered by using the multiple-puncture
technique with a bifurcated needle. For primary vaccination, 2–3
punctures are recommended; for revaccination, 15 punctures.
• Optimal infection-control practices and appropriate site care
should prevent transmission of vaccinia virus from vaccinated
health-care workers to patients. Health-care personnel provid-
ing direct patient care should keep their vaccination sites cov-
ered with gauze in combination with a semipermeable membrane
and a layer of clothing. Administrative leave is not required rou-
tinely for newly vaccinated health-care workers. Persons out-
side the patient-care setting can keep their vaccination sites
covered with a porous dressing. Hand hygiene remains key to
preventing inadvertent inoculation.
• FDA has recommended that vaccinees be deferred from donat-
ing blood for 21 days or until the scab has separated. Contacts
of vaccinees who have inadvertently contracted vaccinia also
would be deferred from donating blood for 14 days after com-
plete resolution of their complication. FDA guidance is located
at http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/smpoxdefquar.htm.
Contraindications to Vaccination
• In the pre-event vaccination program, smallpox vaccination is
contraindicated for persons
— with a history or presence of eczema or atopic dermatitis;
— who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions;
— who have conditions associated with immunosuppression;
— who are pregnant or breastfeeding;
— who are aged <1 year; or
— who have a serious allergy to any component of the vaccine.
• Pre-event vaccination is also contraindicated for persons
— with household contacts who have a history or presence
of eczema or atopic dermatitis;
— who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin conditions;
— who have conditions associated with immunosuppression;
or
— who are pregnant.
• Potential vaccinees should be queried regarding the diagnosis
of atopic dermatitis in themselves or any member of their
household, or regarding the presence of chronic or recurrent
rashes consistent with these diagnoses.
• Before vaccination, women of childbearing age should be
asked if they are pregnant or intend to become pregnant dur-
ing the next 4 weeks; women who respond positively should
not be vaccinated. Any woman who thinks she might be preg-
nant or who wants additional assurance that she is not preg-
nant should perform a urine pregnancy test on the day
scheduled for vaccination. CDC has established a pregnancy
registry to prospectively follow the outcome of such pregnan-
cies and facilitate the investigation of any adverse pregnancy
outcome among pregnant women who were inadvertently
vaccinated. For enrollment in the registry, contact CDC at
404-639-8253.
• Before vaccination, potential vaccinees should be educated
regarding the risk for severe vaccinial complications among
persons with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infec-
tion or other immunosuppressive conditions. Persons who
think they might have one of these conditions should not be
vaccinated. HIV testing is recommended for persons who have
any history of a risk factor for HIV infection and who are
unsure of their HIV infection status.
Adverse Events
• Persons with progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, and
severe generalized vaccinia or inadvertent inoculation might
benefit from therapy with VIG or cidofovir, although the lat-
ter has not been approved by FDA for this indication. Sus-
pected cases of these illnesses or other severe adverse events
after smallpox vaccination should be reported immediately
to state health departments. VIG and cidofovir are available
from CDC for treatment of adverse events among smallpox
vaccine recipients and their contacts under Investigational
New Drug protocols. Clinically severe adverse events after
smallpox vaccination should be reported at the Vaccine Ad-
verse Event Reporting System; reports can be made online at
https://secure.vaers.org/VaersDataEntryintro.htm.
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* Further information regarding the supplement approval and labeling for
Dryvax is located at http://www.fda.gov/cber/products/smalwye102502.htm.
adverse events among vaccinees as well as the risk for trans-
mission of vaccinia to their contacts (e.g., patients or
household members) and resulting adverse events among
those contacts.
• Smallpox Vaccine and Vaccinia Immune Globulin
Supply. ACIP assumes that both smallpox vaccine and
vaccinia immune globulin (VIG) will be available for use,
in sufficient supply, handled and administered according
to standard protocols, and that any pre-event use of
smallpox vaccine will be voluntary.
• State and Local Vaccination Capacity and Capability.
State and local health departments should be able to con-
duct surveillance and containment, including ring vacci-
nation, as the primary strategy for controlling and
containing smallpox. In addition, state and local health
departments should be able, if necessary, to expand vacci-
nation to additional groups, including entire populations,
in a timely manner. CDC has recently issued large-scale
vaccination clinic guidelines to assist state and local health
departments in developing this capacity (9).
Smallpox Vaccines
and VIG Availability
The only smallpox vaccine licensed in the United States is
Dryvax® (manufactured by Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., Marietta,
Pennsylvania), which is a dried calf-lymph–type vaccine.
Dryvax is a lyophilized preparation of live vaccinia virus grown
on the skin of calves (Wyeth Laboratories. Dryvax [Package
insert]. Marietta, PA: Wyeth Laboratories, 1994). On
October 25, 2002, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
approved a labeling supplement and a manufacturing supple-
ment to Wyeth’s biologics license application for Dryvax. The
manufacturing supplement provides for a new kit that includes
lyophilized vaccine in a 100-dose vial, a new supply of diluent
(one prefilled diluent syringe), one transfer needle, and 100
individually wrapped bifurcated needles. With approval of this
supplement, Dryvax can again be distributed and used as a
licensed product. Licensed lots must meet lot-release specifi-
cations, which include recent testing to demonstrate that the
vaccine retains its potency.* As of December 16, 2002, two
lots that included a total of 2.7 million doses of Dryvax had
full approval for use as a licensed product. Additional lots of
Dryvax are expected to be released by FDA under the license.
Licensed Dryvax vaccine for civilian use will only be avail-
able through CDC. Licensed vaccine will be used for vacci-
nating laboratory or health-care workers who directly handle
cultures, animals, or contaminated materials containing
nonhighly attenuated vaccinia or recombinant vaccinia viruses,
or other orthopoxviruses that infect humans (1). Requests for
smallpox vaccine for vaccinating laboratory workers involved
in vaccinia or orthopoxvirus research activities should be
directed to
CDC Drug Services




State health departments are developing plans for vaccinating
smallpox public health and health-care teams and are
responsible for making vaccine requests to CDC for
vaccination of these teams.
CDC’s National Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) has
protocols for rapid, simultaneous delivery of smallpox vac-
cine to every state and U.S. territory within 12–24 hours. State
and local terrorism-response plans should provide for rapid
distribution of vaccine within their jurisdictions.
VIG is available from CDC only under Investigational New
Drug (IND) protocols (i.e., protocols for products that are
not yet licensed). As of January 31, 2003, enough VIG was
available under an IND protocol to treat approximately 4,000
serious adverse events, which is enough VIG doses to treat the
expected number of adverse reactions resulting from vaccina-
tion of 40 million persons, on the basis of previously observed
rates of adverse reactions (10).
Surveillance
Cases of febrile rash illnesses for which smallpox is consid-
ered in the differential diagnosis should be immediately
reported to local or state health departments. After evaluation
by the health departments, if smallpox laboratory diagnostics
are considered necessary, CDC’s Rash Illness Evaluation Team
should be consulted at 770-488-7100. Because smallpox was
officially certified as eradicated in 1980 and no longer occurs
naturally, an initial case of smallpox must be laboratory-
confirmed, which is available only at CDC. Clinical consul-
tation and a preliminary laboratory diagnosis can be completed
within 8–24 hours.
To assist medical and public health personnel in evaluating
the likelihood of smallpox among patients with febrile rash
illnesses, CDC has developed a rash illness assessment
algorithm.† Surveillance activities, including notification
† Poster copies of this algorithm are available from state health departments
and at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/diagnosis. Copies of the poster
can be ordered at https://www2.cdc.gov/nchstp_od/PIWeb/niporderform.asp.
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procedures and laboratory confirmation of cases, will change
if smallpox disease is confirmed in >1 patient.§
Preoutbreak Vaccination of Selected
Groups To Enhance Smallpox
Response Readiness
Smallpox Response Teams
Smallpox vaccination is recommended for persons desig-
nated by appropriate terrorism and public health authorities
to conduct investigations and follow-up of initial smallpox
cases that might necessitate direct patient contact. Addition-
ally, persons responsible for administering smallpox vaccine
in the pre-event vaccination program should be vaccinated
(see Vaccinating Persons Administering Smallpox Vaccine in
the Pre-Event Vaccination Program).
To enhance public health preparedness and response for
smallpox control, specific teams at the federal, state, and local
levels should be established to facilitate diagnostic evaluation
of initial suspected cases of smallpox and to initiate control
measures. These smallpox response teams might include per-
sons designated as medical team leaders, public health advi-
sors, medical epidemiologists, disease investigators, diagnostic
laboratory scientists, nurses, personnel who could administer
smallpox vaccines, security or law enforcement personnel, and
other medical personnel to assist in evaluating suspected small-
pox cases. ACIP recommends that each state and territory
establish and maintain >1 smallpox response team. Consider-
ations for additional teams should include population and
geographic concerns and should be developed in accordance
with federal, state, and local terrorism-response plans.
Smallpox Health-Care Teams
ACIP and HICPAC recommend that in the first stage of
the pre-event smallpox vaccination program, each acute-care
hospital identify groups of health-care workers to be vacci-
nated and trained to provide direct medical care for the first
smallpox patients requiring hospital admission and to evalu-
ate and manage patients who are examined at emergency
departments with suspected smallpox. This team should pro-
vide care 24 hours/day for the first >2 days after patients with
smallpox have been identified, until additional health-care per-
sonnel are vaccinated. Nonvaccinated workers should be
restricted from entering the rooms of smallpox patients or,
under emergency conditions, should wear personal protective
equipment.
ACIP and HICPAC recommend that smallpox health-care
teams include
• emergency department staff, including physicians and
nurses caring for children and adults;
• intensive-care–unit staff, including physicians, nurses, and
in hospitals that care for infants and children, pediatricians
and pediatric intensive care specialists;
• general medical unit staff, including nurses, internists,
pediatricians, hospitalists (i.e., physicians whose practice
emphasizes providing care for hospitalized patients), and
family physicians in institutions where these persons are
the essential providers of in-patient medical care;
• primary-care house staff (i.e., medical, pediatric, and
family physicians);





• security personnel; and
• housekeeping staff (e.g., those staff involved in maintain-
ing the health-care environment and decreasing the risk
for fomite transmission).
ACIP and HICPAC anticipate that the size and composi-
tion of smallpox health-care teams will vary according to the
institutions and their patient populations, but each hospital
should ideally have enough vaccinated personnel from each
occupational category to ensure continuity of care. When fea-
sible, the first-stage vaccination program should include pre-
viously vaccinated health-care personnel to further decrease
the potential for adverse events, because adverse events occur
less commonly among previously vaccinated persons.
Clinical laboratory workers are not recommended for
inclusion in the initial phase of pre-event smallpox vaccina-
tion because the quantity of smallpox virus likely to be in
clinical specimens of blood and body fluids is low. Consistent
adherence to the Standard Precautions and biosafety proto-
cols for protection of laboratory workers will prevent
exposure to smallpox virus in clinical specimens (11–14).
§ Additional information regarding surveillance activities after laboratory
confirmation of a smallpox outbreak is located in CDC’s Smallpox Response
Plan and Guidelines (http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/response-plan/
index.asp).
¶ This might involve creating regional teams of subspecialists (e.g., local medical
consultants with smallpox experience, dermatologists, ophthalmologists,
pathologists, surgeons, anesthesiologists in facilities where intensivists [i.e.,
physicians who are board-certified in a medical specialty and who receive
special training in critical care] are not trained in anesthesia) to deliver
consultative services.
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Vaccination Method
The skin over the insertion of the deltoid muscle or the
posterior aspect of the arm over the triceps muscle is the pre-
ferred site for smallpox vaccination. Skin preparation for vac-
cination is not required unless the area is grossly contaminated,
in which case soap and water should be used to clean the site.
If alcohol or another chemical antiseptic is used, the skin must
be allowed to dry thoroughly to prevent inactivation of the
vaccine virus by the antiseptic. The multiple-puncture tech-
nique uses a presterilized bifurcated needle that is inserted
vertically into the vaccine vial, causing a small droplet of vac-
cine (approximately 0.0025 mL) to adhere between the prongs
of the needle. The droplet contains the recommended dosage
of vaccine, and its presence within the prongs of the bifur-
cated needle should be confirmed visually. Holding the bifur-
cated needle perpendicular to the skin, punctures are made
rapidly, with strokes vigorous enough to allow a trace of blood
to appear after 15–20 seconds (4). According to the product
labeling, 2–3 punctures are recommended for primary vacci-
nation and 15 punctures for revaccination. If no trace of blood
is visible after vaccination, an additional three insertions should
be made by using the same bifurcated needle without
reinserting the needle into the vaccine vial. If no evidence of
vaccine take is apparent after 7 days, the person can be vacci-
nated again. Any remaining vaccine should be wiped off the
skin with dry sterile gauze and the gauze disposed of in a
biohazard waste container.
Vaccinating Persons Administering
Smallpox Vaccine in the Pre-Event
Vaccination Program
Historically, vaccinators were administering smallpox vac-
cine as part of a disease control or eradication program and
were revaccinated frequently. No data exist regarding the risks
for inadvertent inoculation of vaccinia among susceptible vac-
cinators, but they are assumed to have a certain level of risk.
The risk might be analogous to that observed among labora-
tory workers handling nonhighly attenuated vaccinia strains;
ACIP recommends that these workers be vaccinated (1). Prior
vaccination probably confers substantial protection, but local
reactions can occur among revaccinees; thus, protection from
clinically significant inadvertent inoculation cannot be
considered absolute (15).
ACIP and HICPAC recommend that persons administer-
ing smallpox vaccine in the pre-event vaccination program be
vaccinated to minimize clinical effects of inadvertent inocula-
tion, if inadvertent inoculation occurs. Ideally, vaccinators
should have a confirmed vaccine take before vaccinating oth-
ers, but administering vaccine to vaccinators immediately
before beginning work in vaccination clinics is acceptable. Vac-
cination of this group will also contribute to preparedness for
smallpox response. If a smallpox release occurs, experienced




After primary smallpox vaccination, vaccinia virus can be
isolated from the vaccination site, beginning with develop-
ment of a papule (i.e., 2–5 days after vaccination) until the
scab separates from the skin lesion (i.e., 14–21 days after vac-
cination), with maximal shedding at 4–14 days after vaccina-
tion. Viral shedding might be of shorter duration among
revaccinees (16,17). During the interval in which vaccinia
virus is shed, inadvertent inoculation can occur from the vac-
cination site to another area of the body, most commonly the
face, eyelid, nose, lips, genitalia, or anus. In addition, trans-
mission could occur to another nonimmune person, leading
to self-limited infections or to more serious complications,
particularly among persons with medical contraindications to
vaccination. The risk for mortality from eczema vaccinatum
might be higher among infected contacts than among vaccinees
(10,18,19).
Data from the smallpox eradication era indicate that pri-
mary vaccinees were the major source of vaccinia infection
among contacts, presumably because they had a larger or longer
duration of viral shedding than did revaccinees (16,18). Trans-
mission usually required close interaction, occurred most
often in the home, and often involved children (18). Nosoco-
mial transmission of vaccinia from either patients or health-
care workers to patients has rarely been described; in the
majority of instances, the source of vaccinia was a patient suf-
fering from an adverse event after vaccination. The majority
of these cases involved direct person-to-person transmission,
though for certain persons, the mode of spread was not deter-
mined (18,20–22). These data indicate that secondary trans-
mission of vaccinia virus occurs infrequently, especially from
adults, and requires close contact. However, today, both the
risk for transmission and the risk that a serious adverse event
might result if transmission occurs might be greater than dur-
ing the smallpox era. At the time of the earlier studies, the
majority of health-care workers would have been vaccinated
previously and therefore were less likely to transmit vaccinia;
moreover, the majority of patients were vaccinated also and
were less likely to be susceptible to vaccinia. The number of
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health-care workers who had been vaccinated during these
earlier study periods is unknown, but vaccination of health-
care workers was routinely recommended. The number of
hospitalized patients at risk for serious complications of vac-
cinia infection is higher now and includes those persons with
compromised immune systems from human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV) infection or acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS), chemotherapy, or other immunosuppres-
sive medications, organ transplantation, or similar conditions.
More patients with indwelling invasive devices requiring fre-
quent manipulation (e.g., intravenous lines, arterial lines,
dialysis, ostomies, or central venous lines) are being cared for
on hospital wards. Infection-control practices have improved
also, and health-care workers are more cognizant of infection-
control practices than in earlier years. Additionally, new
approaches to vaccination site care (i.e., semipermeable dress-
ings) provide an effective barrier for containment of vaccinia
virus (16,23).
After considering the data and the caveats noted previously,
ACIP and HICPAC concluded that optimal infection-
control practices should essentially eliminate the risk of vacci-
nated health-care workers transmitting vaccinia to patients,
and that placing health-care workers on administrative leave
could create staffing shortages that might pose a risk to
patients (24,25).
Consequently, ACIP and HICPAC recommend that, after
smallpox vaccination, health-care personnel providing direct
patient care should keep their vaccination sites covered with
gauze or a similar absorbent material in combination with a
semipermeable dressing to absorb exudates that develop and
to provide a barrier for containment of vaccinia virus to mini-
mize the risk of transmission (16,23). Alternatively, products
combining an absorbent base with an overlying semiperme-
able layer can be used to cover the site. Semipermeable dress-
ings provide an effective barrier to vaccinia virus, but use of a
semipermeable dressing alone is associated with maceration
of the vaccination site and increased irritation and itching at
the site (23), thereby causing touching, scratching, and pos-
sible contamination of the hands. The vaccination site should
be covered with gauze, a semipermeable dressing, and a layer
of clothing during direct patient care until the scab separates.
Dressings used to cover the site should be changed frequently
(e.g., every 3–5 days or more frequently if exudates accumu-
late) to prevent buildup of exudates and consequent
maceration.
The most critical measure in preventing contact transmis-
sion is consistent hand hygiene with antimicrobial soap and
water or an approved alcohol-based hand-rub (i.e., one that
contains >60% alcohol) after any contact with the
vaccination site or with materials that have come into contact
with the site and before patient contact (26). In addition, care
should be taken to prevent contact with the site or contami-
nated materials from the site.
Hospitals should include a vaccination site-care component
in their smallpox vaccination programs in which designated
staff assess dressings for all vaccinated health-care workers daily
(whether the workers are involved in direct patient care or in
other duties), determine if dressings need changing (e.g., when
accumulation of purulent material is visible or the integrity of
the dressing has been disrupted), and change the dressing, if
indicated. These designated staff should assess the vaccina-
tion site for local reactions and for vaccine take; reinforce edu-
cation of vaccinees regarding the need for meticulous hand
hygiene; and record and report serious adverse events after
vaccination (see Reporting and Managing Adverse Events).
When feasible, staff responsible for dressing changes for teams
should be vaccinated, but having nonvaccinated staff change
dressings is acceptable. All persons handling bandages should
observe contact precautions.
Persons outside the patient-care setting (e.g., members of
public health response teams not involved in patient care, or
health-care workers who are not at work) can keep their vacci-
nation sites covered with a porous dressing (e.g., gauze); hand
hygiene remains critical in preventing inadvertent inoculation.
In nonpatient-care settings in which transmission of vaccinia
is a concern because of close personal contact with children or
other persons, the vaccination site should be covered with gauze
or a similar absorbent material and covered with clothing.
Hypoallergenic tape should be used for persons who
experience tape hypersensitivity.
 The vaccination site should be kept dry, although normal
showering or bathing can continue. A waterproof dressing
might decrease the risk for autoinoculation while washing; if
the site is uncovered, care should be taken to avoid touching
it. After showering, if the vaccination site is wet, it should be
blotted dry with gauze, which is then discarded. If a towel is
used to dry the site, the towel should not be used to dry the
rest of the body. Alternatively, the site can be allowed to air
dry before replacing the bandage. No salves, creams, or oint-
ments should be placed on the site. Contaminated bandages
and, if possible, the vaccination site scab, after it has fallen off,
should be placed in sealed plastic bags before disposal in the
trash to further decrease the potential for inadvertent trans-
mission of the live virus contained in the materials. Clothing,
towels, and other cloth materials that have had contact with
the site can be decontaminated with routine laundering in
hot water (27,28).
Vol. 52 / RR-7 Recommendations and Reports 9
** FDA guidance is available at http://www.fda.gov/cber/gdlns/
smpoxdefquar.htm.
Administrative Leave for Vaccinated
Health-Care Workers
Administrative leave is not required routinely for newly vac-
cinated health-care personnel unless they 1) are physically
unable to work because of systemic signs and symptoms of
illness; 2) have extensive skin lesions that cannot be covered
adequately; or 3) are unable to adhere to the recommended
infection-control precautions. The close contact required for
transmission of vaccinia to household contacts is unlikely to
occur in the health-care setting.
Vaccination and Blood Donation
FDA has recommended that vaccinees be deferred from
donating blood for 21 days or until the scab has separated.
Contacts of vaccinees who have inadvertently contracted vac-
cinia also should be deferred from donating blood for 14 days
after complete resolution of their complication.** If a sub-
stantial number of persons are vaccinated within a brief period,
the resulting donor deferrals could impact blood availability.
Blood supply shortages can be serious. Blood and platelet
donors can help sustain blood supplies by donating immedi-
ately before being vaccinated and donating again after they
are eligible. Because the donor deferral period needs to be
documented carefully, all vaccinees should save the written
record of their vaccination. Saving this record also will help to
determine vaccination status and donor eligibility in the event
of a smallpox outbreak.
Contraindications for Use
of Smallpox Vaccine in the
Pre-Event Vaccination Program
The conditions discussed in this section are contraindications
in the pre-event vaccination program. No absolute
contraindications exist to defer vaccination for persons with
high-risk exposure to smallpox; persons at greatest risk for
experiencing serious vaccination complications are also at great-
est risk for death if they become infected with the smallpox
virus. If a relative contraindication to vaccination exists in the
setting of a terrorism threat or exposure, the risk of experienc-
ing serious vaccination complications must be weighed against
the risk of experiencing a potentially fatal smallpox infection
(1).
In the pre-event vaccination program, smallpox vaccination
is contraindicated (Table) for persons
• with a history or presence of eczema or atopic dermatitis;
• who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin
conditions;
• who have conditions associated with immunosuppression;
• who are pregnant or breastfeeding;
• who are aged <1 year; or
• who have a serious allergy to any component of the vaccine.
According to the package insert (Wyeth Laboratories. Dryvax
[Package insert]. Marietta, PA: Wyeth Laboratories, 1994),
the vaccine might contain trace amounts of polymyxin B, strep-
tomycin, tetracycline, and neomycin, and the diluent contains
glycerin and phenol.
Atopic dermatitis, irrespective of disease severity or activity,
is a risk factor for developing eczema vaccinatum after small-
pox vaccination among either vaccinees or their close contacts
(10,29–33), but no data exist to predict the absolute risk for
this population. Because the majority of primary-care provid-
ers do not distinguish between eczema and atopic dermatitis,
including when describing chronic exfoliative skin conditions
among infants (34,35), ACIP recommends that smallpox vac-
cine not be administered to persons with a history of eczema
or atopic dermatitis, irrespective of disease severity or activity.
Persons with other active acute, chronic, or exfoliative con-
ditions (e.g., burns, impetigo, varicella zoster, herpes, severe
acne, severe diaper dermatitis with extensive areas of denuded
skin, or psoriasis) are at higher risk for clinically severe inad-
vertent inoculation and should not be vaccinated until the
condition resolves. Additionally, persons with Darier disease
(keratosis follicularis) can develop eczema vaccinatum and
therefore should not be vaccinated (32,36).
Replication of vaccinia virus can be enhanced among per-
sons with cellular or humoral immunodeficiencies and among
those with immunosuppression (e.g., HIV/AIDS, leukemia,
lymphoma, generalized malignancy, solid organ transplanta-
tion, or therapy with alkylating agents, antimetabolites,
radiation, or high-dose corticosteroids [i.e., >2 mg/kg body
weight or 20 mg/day of prednisone for >2 weeks]). Persons
who are taking or have taken high-dose corticosteroids should
not be vaccinated within 1 month of completing corticoster-
oid therapy, and persons treated with other immunosuppres-
sive drugs within the previous 3 months should not be
vaccinated (37). Persons with immunosuppression also include
hematopoietic stem cell transplant recipients who are <24
months posttransplant, and hematopoietic stem cell transplant
recipients who are >24 months posttransplant, but have graft-
versus-host disease or disease relapse. Patients with severe clini-
cal manifestations of certain autoimmune diseases (e.g.,
systemic lupus erythematosis) might have a degree of
immunocompromise as a component of the disease (38).
Although no data exist to indicate that a person is at risk from
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live-virus vaccines because of severe autoimmune disease in
the absence of immunosuppressive therapy, persons with
immunodeficiency as a clinical component of their autoim-
mune disease should not receive smallpox vaccine during the
pre-event vaccination program.
According to product labeling, smallpox vaccine is not rec-
ommended for use among breastfeeding women (Wyeth Labo-
ratories. Dryvax [Package insert]. Marietta, PA: Wyeth
Laboratories, 1994); whether vaccine virus or antibodies are
excreted in human milk is unknown. ACIP does not recom-
mend smallpox vaccination of children and adolescents aged
<18 years in the pre-event vaccination program, and smallpox
vaccine is contraindicated for infants aged <1 year.
Pre-event vaccination is also contraindicated among per-
sons with household contacts who have a history or presence
of eczema or atopic dermatitis, irrespective of disease severity
or activity; who have other acute, chronic, or exfoliative skin
conditions; who have conditions associated with immunosup-
pression (see previous discussion); or who are pregnant. For
purposes of screening for contraindications for pre-event vac-
cination, household contacts include persons with prolonged
intimate contact with the potential vaccinee (e.g., sexual
contacts) and others who might have direct contact with the
vaccination site.
The presence of an adolescent or child (including an infant)
in the household is not a contraindication to vaccination of
adult members of the household; the risk for serious compli-
cations from transmission from an adult to a child is limited.
Nonetheless, ACIP recognizes that programs might defer vac-
cination of household contacts of infants aged <1 year
because of data indicating a higher risk for adverse events
among primary vaccinees in this age group, compared with
that among older children (31). The presence of a breastfeeding
woman or a person with a vaccine component allergy in the
household is also not a contraindication to vaccination of other
household members (Table).
Precautions for Smallpox Vaccination
Persons with inflammatory eye diseases can be at increased
risk for inadvertent inoculation as a result of touching or rub-
bing the eye. Therefore, deferring vaccination of persons with
inflammatory eye diseases requiring steroid treatment is pru-
dent until the condition resolves and the course of therapy is
complete.
Screening for Atopic Dermatitis as a
Contraindication for Vaccination
To assist providers in identifying persons who should defer
smallpox vaccination, ACIP recommends using two screen-
ing questions (Figure). Although sensitive, this approach to
screening might preclude vaccination of persons who could
otherwise be safely vaccinated. Certain organizations (e.g., the
military or CDC) might elect to develop more precise screen-
ing tools for persons among whom the dermatologic risk fac-
tor or diagnosis is uncertain. These secondary screening tools
should weigh the person’s risk of developing an adverse event
with the requirement of occupational readiness through safe
smallpox vaccination.
Screening for Pregnancy as a
Contraindication for Vaccination
Fetal vaccinia is a rare, but serious, complication of small-
pox vaccination during pregnancy or immediately before con-
ception. Infection, which can spread to the fetus if viremia




History or presence of eczema or atopic dermatitis X X




Aged <1 year¶ X
Vaccine component allergy X
* For purposes of screening for contraindications for pre-event vaccination, household contacts include persons with prolonged intimate contact with the
potential vaccinee (e.g., sexual contacts) and others who might have direct contact with the vaccination site.
† Conditions include burns, impetigo, varicella zoster, herpes, severe acne, or psoriasis. Persons with these conditions should not be vaccinated until the
dermatologic condition resolves.
§ Conditions include human immunodeficiency virus, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, leukemia, lymphoma, generalized malignancy, solid organ
transplantation, cellular or humoral immunodeficiencies, or therapy with alkylating agents, antimetabolites, radiation, or high-dose corticosteroids.
¶ Vaccination of infants aged <1 year is contraindicated. Additionally, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices does not recommend vaccinating
children and adolescents aged <18 years in the pre-event smallpox vaccination program.
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occurs after vaccination, is manifested by typical skin lesions,
organ involvement, and fetal or early neonatal death (39).
During 1932–1972, of 20 affected pregnancies, 18 occurred
when the pregnant woman was vaccinated, and two occurred
among pregnant contacts; 13 occurred among primary
vaccinees, and three among those being revaccinated. Seven
occurred during the first trimester, and 13 in the second tri-
mester. Only one of 20 pregnancies was maintained until term,
and of 21 affected births (one birth was of twins), three
infants survived (39). A cohort study of pregnant women vac-
cinated during a mass campaign in Sweden in 1963 demon-
strated a higher than expected rate of fetal loss (40); however,
pathology was not performed to evaluate causation, and
vaccinees might have been at higher risk for adverse outcomes
of pregnancy. Smallpox vaccination of pregnant women has
not been associated with an increased risk for congenital
malformations (41).
Because of the limited risk but severe consequences of fetal
infection, smallpox vaccine should not be administered in a
pre-event setting to pregnant women or to women who are
trying to become pregnant. Before vaccination, women of
childbearing age should be asked if they are pregnant or
intend to become pregnant in the next 4 weeks; women who
respond positively should not be vaccinated. To further
reduce the risk for inadvertently vaccinating a woman who is
pregnant, at the time of prescreening women of childbearing
age should be educated regarding what is known about fetal
vaccinia. Women should be counseled to avoid becoming preg-
nant until >4 weeks after vaccination, and abstinence or highly
effective contraceptive measures should be recommended to
reduce the risk of pregnancy before
or within 4 weeks after vaccination.
Any woman who believes she might
be pregnant or who wants addi-
tional assurance that she is not
pregnant should perform a urine
pregnancy test by using her first-
morning–void urine on the day
scheduled for vaccination. Such
tests could be made available at the
prescreening and vaccination sites
to avoid cost or other barriers to
testing. However, women should
be informed that a negative urine
pregnancy test cannot exclude a
very early pregnancy, and therefore,
they and their health-care provid-
ers should not base a decision
regarding their pregnancy status
solely on a urine pregnancy test
result (42).
If a pregnant woman is inadvertently vaccinated or if she
becomes pregnant within 4 weeks after smallpox vaccination,
she should be counseled regarding concern for the fetus. Small-
pox vaccination during pregnancy should not ordinarily be a
reason to terminate pregnancy. To expand understanding of
the risk for fetal vaccinia and to document whether other
adverse pregnancy outcomes might be associated with vacci-
nation, CDC has established a pregnancy registry to prospec-
tively follow the outcome of such pregnancies and facilitate
the investigation of any adverse pregnancy outcome among
pregnant women who were inadvertently vaccinated. For
enrollment in the registry, contact CDC at 404-639-8253.
Screening for HIV Infection as a
Contraindication for Vaccination
Persons with HIV infection or AIDS might have an increased
risk for severe adverse reactions resulting from live-virus vac-
cines. Because the HIV epidemic began after the cessation of
routine smallpox vaccination, data are limited regarding the
risks from vaccination among HIV-infected persons. A single
case report has been published of a U.S. military recruit who
developed disseminated vaccinia after smallpox vaccination
and who was successfully treated with VIG, but later died
from complications of AIDS (43). Although the exact num-
ber of HIV-infected persons who were vaccinated in the mili-
tary program is unclear, 732 recruits who were in the service
during 1981–1985, when vaccinations were administered,
tested HIV-positive during 1985–1988, for an estimated fre-
FIGURE. Questions used to screen for eczema and atopic dermatitis among potential recipients
of smallpox vaccine.
Question 1: Have you or a member of
your household ever been diagnosed
with eczema or atopic dermatitis?
Do not vaccinate.
Question 2: Eczema or atopic dermatitis
is an itchy, red, scaly rash that comes
and goes but usually lasts >2 weeks.
Have you or a member of your
household ever had a rash like that?
Continue screening process
for other contraindications.
Do not vaccinate unless the vaccinee
and his or her health-care provider are
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quency of serious adverse events among HIV-positive persons
of 1/732, or 0.137% (95% confidence interval [CI] = 0.084%–
0.22%); if only half were HIV-positive at the time of vaccina-
tion, the frequency increases to 1/366, or 0.273% (95% CI =
0.17%–0.44%) (Col. Deborah L. Birx, M.D., Walter Reed
Army Institute of Medicine, personal communication,
September 2002). Because the immunologic status of an HIV-
infected person is probably the key to the risk from vaccina-
tion and the immunologic status of the recruits at the time of
vaccination was unknown, these estimated rates might not
apply to other groups of HIV-infected persons.
An estimated 850,000–950,000 HIV-infected persons are
living in the United States (prevalence: 0.3%), and of these,
an estimated 180,000–280,000 are unaware that they are
infected (44). Estimates of the number of HIV-infected health-
care workers range from approximately 21,000 to 48,000
(CDC, Division of Health Care Quality Promotion, unpub-
lished data, 2002), and the proportion of these infected health-
care workers who remain undiagnosed is unknown. Risk
assessment followed by counseling and testing is useful in iden-
tifying persons with HIV infection. However, substantial num-
bers of HIV-infected persons might not recognize or
acknowledge their risk during risk-assessment screening (45).
Smallpox vaccine should not be administered to persons
with HIV infection or AIDS as part of a pre-event program
because of their increased risk for progressive vaccinia (vac-
cinia necrosum). Before vaccination, potential vaccinees should
be educated regarding the risk for severe vaccinial complica-
tions among persons with HIV infection or other immuno-
suppressive conditions; persons who think they might have
one of these conditions should not be vaccinated.
ACIP does not recommend mandatory HIV testing before
smallpox vaccination, but recommends that HIV testing
should be readily available to all persons considering small-
pox vaccination. HIV testing is recommended for persons who
have any history of a risk factor for HIV infection and who
are unsure of their HIV infection status. Because known risk
factors cannot be identified for certain persons with HIV
infection, anyone who is concerned that they could have HIV
infection also should be tested. HIV testing should be avail-
able in a confidential or anonymous setting, as allowed by
local laws and regulations, with results communicated to the
potential vaccinee before the planned date of vaccination. Per-
sons with a positive test result should be advised not to be
vaccinated. Information regarding local testing options should
be provided to all potential vaccinees, including sites where
testing is performed at no cost. The recently licensed rapid





Simultaneously administering the most widely used live and
inactivated vaccines has produced seroconversion rates and
rates of adverse reactions similar to those observed when the
vaccines are administered separately (47–50). Inactivated vac-
cines do not interfere with the immune response to other
inactivated vaccines or to live vaccines. An inactivated vaccine
can be administered either simultaneously or at any time
before or after a different inactivated vaccine or live vaccine.
The immune response to one live-virus vaccine might be
impaired if administered within 30 days of another live-virus
vaccine, if not administered simultaneously (51,52). To mini-
mize the potential risk for interference, parenterally adminis-
tered live vaccines not administered on the same day should
be administered >4 weeks apart, whenever possible. If parenter-
ally administered live vaccines are separated by <4 weeks, the
vaccine administered second should not be counted as a valid
dose and should be repeated. The repeat dose should be
administered >4 weeks after the last, invalid dose (37).
Smallpox vaccine can be administered at the same time as
certain other vaccines, with levels of safety and efficacy com-
parable to those observed when the vaccines are administered
separately (53). Vaccines that have been documented to be
effective when administered simultaneously with smallpox
vaccine include oral polio vaccine, bacille of Calmette-Guérin
(BCG) vaccine, yellow fever vaccine, measles vaccine, and diph-
theria and tetanus toxoids and whole-cell pertussis vaccine (53).
However, no data exist regarding simultaneous administra-
tion of smallpox vaccine with other vaccines now routinely
administered to children and adults in the United States.
Varicella vaccine virus lesions might be confused with vac-
cinia lesions if the vaccines were administered simultaneously.
In uncontrolled trials of persons aged >13 years, approximately
1,600 vaccinees who received 1 dose and 955 who received 2
doses of varicella vaccine were monitored for 42 days for
adverse events (Merck and Co., Inc. Varivax [Package insert].
West Point, PA: Merck and Co., 1995). After the first and
second doses, a nonlocalized rash consisting of a median num-
ber of five lesions developed in 5.5% and 0.9% of vaccinees,
respectively, and occurred at a peak of 7–21 days and 0–23
days postvaccination, respectively (54).
Smallpox vaccine can be administered simultaneously with
any inactivated vaccine (e.g., influenza vaccine) to encourage
appropriate receipt of all indicated vaccines (e.g., among such
populations as health-care workers). With the exception of
varicella vaccine, smallpox vaccine can be administered simul-
taneously with other live-virus vaccines. To avoid confusion
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in ascertaining which vaccine might have caused
postvaccination skin lesions or other adverse events, and
facilitate managing such events, varicella vaccine and small-
pox vaccine should only be administered >4 weeks apart.
Timing of Tuberculosis Screening
and Smallpox Vaccination
Suppression of tuberculin skin test (purified protein deriva-
tive [PPD]) reactivity has been demonstrated after adminis-
tration of smallpox vaccine (55), as has been observed after
administration of other parenteral live-virus vaccines (37).
Health-care workers scheduled to receive an annual PPD skin
test should not receive the skin test for 1 month after small-
pox vaccination to prevent possible false-negative reactions.
Reporting and Managing
Adverse Events
Persons with progressive vaccinia, eczema vaccinatum, and
severe generalized vaccinia or inadvertent inoculation might
benefit from therapy with VIG or cidofovir, although the lat-
ter has not been approved by FDA for this indication. Sus-
pected cases of these illnesses or other serious adverse events
after smallpox vaccination should be reported immediately to
state health departments. VIG and cidofovir are available from
CDC for treatment of adverse events among smallpox vac-
cine recipients and their contacts under IND protocols. Rec-
ommendations regarding treatment of adverse events have been
published recently (56).
Additionally, serious adverse events after smallpox vaccina-
tion should be reported to the Vaccine Adverse Event Report-
ing System (VAERS). Reports can be submitted through a
secure Internet-based system at https://secure.vaers.org/
VaersDataEntryintro.htm. Printable VAERS forms are located
online at http://www.vaers.org/pdf/vaers_form.pdf, or postage-
paid forms can be obtained by calling 800-822-7967 (toll-
free). Submission of VAERS reports by Internet is encouraged
to expedite processing and data entry. Completed forms can
be faxed to 877-721-0366 (toll-free) or mailed to P.O. Box
1100, Rockville, MD 20894-1100. Additional information
related to VAERS reporting can be obtained by calling
800-822-7967 or by e-mail at info@vaers.org.
Future Directions
ACIP will review these recommendations periodically or
more urgently, if necessary. These reviews will include new
information or developments related to smallpox disease, small-
pox vaccines (including licensure of additional smallpox vac-
cines), risk of smallpox attack, smallpox vaccine adverse events,
and the experience gained in the implementation of these rec-
ommendations. Revised recommendations will be developed
as needed.
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